Buhner Dot Com Est. 2000, which is like 1947 in Internet years.

The myth of the “small market team”

When you listen to people talk about "small market teams", or even just money and baseball, there seems to be some confusion between not having resources and not spending resources.

As I've mentioned before, the main money differential between the "haves" and "have nots" in baseball comes down to local television revenue. Major League Baseball has a national television contract with FOX and with ESPN that generates a great deal of income, which is evenly distributed to all the teams in the league. This is good. However, individual teams also have the right to sell their local television rights to the highest bidder and keep all of that money for themselves. That's good for some, but not so good for others. How much money those teams receive from their local television contracts depend on two factors - how much advertising money showing those games can potentially bring to a network, and how many networks want to gain control of those rights.

Bidding wars can't be predicted. Sometimes a new network enters the fray, sometimes networks drop out, maybe a team gets more popular because they're winning more, maybe the popularity drops because they're winning less. Potential advertising money, however, can be estimated pretty safely.

Now, an advertiser wants, ideally, for his ad to be seen by as many people as possible. The more people they reach, the more value it has. So, value can be directly attributed to the number of potential households that ad will reach. Since the network is local (at least, in most cases), the number of potential viewers is measured by the number of television views in that metropolitan area. If you go by Neilson numbers, this is how the TV markets look in major league cities:

1 - New York (Yankees, Mets) - 7,355,710
2 - Los Angeles (Dodgers, Angels) - 5,431,140
3 - Chicago (Cubs, White Sox) - 3,417,330
4 - Philadelphia (Phillies) - 2,919,410
5 - Boston (Red Sox) - 2,391,840
6 - San Francisco-Oak-San Jose (A's, Giants) - 2,359,870
7 - Dallas-Ft. Worth (Rangers) - 2,292,760
8 - Washington, DC (Nationals) - 2,241,610
9 - Atlanta (Braves) - 2,059,450
10 - Detroit (Tigers) - 1,943,930
11 - Houston (Astros) - 1,902,810
12 - Seattle-Tacoma (Mariners) - 1,690,640
13 - Tampa-St. Pete (Devil Rays) - 1,671,040
14 - Minneapolis-St. Paul (Twins) - 1,665,540
15 - Phoenix (Prescott), AZ (Diamondbacks) - 1,596,950
16 - Cleveland-Akron (Indians) - 1,556,670
17 - Miami-Ft. Lauderdale (Marlins) - 1,496,810
18 - Denver (Rockies) - 1,401,760
21 - St. Louis (Cardinals) - 1,216,700
22 - Pittsburgh (Pirates) - 1,186,010
23 - Baltimore (Orioles) - 1,087,730
26 - San Diego (Padres) - 1,025,730
31 - Kansas City (Royals) - 894,580
32 - Milwaukee (Brewers) - 886,770
33 - Cincinnati (Reds) - 883,230

Of course, this doesn't take into effect neighboring markets, but when it comes to "local TV", this is pretty much what we're dealing with.

The success of a team plays into this, making a channel's ownership of television rights more attractive. Two teams with very similar baseball markets in size, Pittsburgh and St. Louis, are going to have very different sales numbers because the Cardinals win, and therefore get viewers. The Pirates don't. Therefore, the Cardinals' rights are going to go for a lot more than the Pirates.

Market size does play a role, though. The cost of three commercials during a Reds game is never going to approach the price that it costs for three commercials during a Yankees game. But teams that are relatively even (Tampa, Minneapolis, and Phoenix, for example) can greatly affect their own performance by how they use the money they have instead of complaining about how much they actually have.

Tampa spent early and unwisely (Greg Vaughn, Wilson Alvarez), failed, and got labeled with the reputation of a failure, which drove off fans. Tampa now conserves their money and builds a team based on youth (or at least says they do, which isn't always apparent).

Phoenix spent money they didn't have with the belief that if they built a winner now, they'd establish the fan base early and not be as concerned when those big name players got old and they needed to rebuild. Arizona has since hit their bottom (last season) and have decided to start spending again, whose results remain to be seen.

The Twins ownership maintains they're a small market team that needs to tighten their belt in order to survive. However, the Twins aren't as low in the TV money picture as one would be led to believe, so their belt-tightening can only go towards profit for ownership. While that's not necessarily a bad thing, to blame it on market share instead of an ownership decision is questionable.

There's a few numbers in there that stand out. First off is #8, Washington. It's easy to see why Orioles owner Peter Angelos didn't want to see the Expos roll into town. Angelos' Orioles could claim Washington as their market as well, adding the #8 market to their #23 market in Baltimore. While the Orioles still have a TV contract in Washington (and, interestingly, the Nationals do not), once the Orioles contract runs out, the likely focus of Washington DC stations will be their hometown Nats instead of the O's, leaving the O's to deal with their #23 media market, putting them shoulder to shoulder with the Pittsburghs and San Diegos of the league. Another is St. Louis at #21. Now, people don't think of the Cardinals as a small market team, despite them literally being in a "small market", smaller than 22 other teams. Yet, they ranked 10th in payroll. They rank lower in market size than Oakland (splitting the #6) and Minnesota (#14), two teams that seem to regularly cry poverty.

In case you were curious, the markets missing in the list that don't have major league teams are Sacramento (#19), Orlando (#20), Portland, OR (#24), Indianapolis (#25), Hartford/New Haven (#27), Charlotte (#28), Raleigh-Durham (#29), and Nashville (#30).

So just because a team doesn't spend money or doesn't draw fans, it doesn't necessarily mean that they're a "small market".

Scott Elarton, you go boy!

I took a flier on Scott Elarton in my Scoresheet league this year, mainly because it's always good to have innings guys, but because I thought he'd be a decent risk. I threw him out on the second day of the draft early, and people ran from him like the plague, and I got him for the league minimum. I ended up signing him for two years.

Elarton was pencilled in as a 5th starter for Cleveland going into spring training, and appears to have secured his spot in the rotation between the injury to C.C. Sabathia and a great spring, going 3-1 in five spring starts with a 2.70 ERA.

A former top prospect for Houston, Elarton pitched well in a relief role for the Astros, with the occasional spot start until making the rotation for good in 2000, at the age of 24. His 2000 season saw a drop off in his numbers, but the powerful Astros offense defended him, allowing him to pile up 17 wins, albeit with a 4.81 ERA. Elarton's poor ERA was the lowest in the rotation, however.

Elarton's dropoff in strikeouts foreshadowed potential problems, and Houston dealt him to Colorado for Pedro Astacio, himself having a weak season. Both would end up having shoulder problems, and Astacio only pitched four games for Houston the remainder of the season, before leaving as a free agent.

Elarton, already having problems keeping the ball in the park at Enron, ended up in a worse situation in Coors Field. Elarton pitched four games himself for Colorado after the deal from Houston, got shut down, and then missed the entire 2002 season with a torn labrum. Torn labrum's are bad news - unlike other pitching injuries (including the vaunted Tommy John surgery - ulnar collateral ligament reconstruction - where 85% of pitchers are expected to make a full comeback) torn labrums are pretty much the nail in the coffin. To quote Buhner.com favorite Will Carroll, "if pitchers with torn labrums were horses, they'd be destroyed."

Ouchies.

The list of once promising pitchers who've had torn labrums reads like a "whatever happened to?" reunion: Mike Harkey, Robert Person, Jim Parque, Mike Sirotka, Ryan Anderson. Hell, two pitchers who are currently in the league other than Elarton who have come back from labrum surgery, Gil Meche and Rocky Biddle, didn't exactly light up the majors last year, with Meche posting a 5.01 ERA and Biddle's ERA a sterling 6.92.

All isn't lost, though. Meche's 2004 problems may have had more to do with mechanics than his shoulder - after being sent down to AAA and later recalled, Meche had a 3.95 ERA in 13 starts, to go along with a 6-2 record. While his strikeouts aren't impressive, that's still quality pitching. Elarton, after getting hammered in Colorado and finally getting released by the Rockies, signed on with Cleveland in 2004. In Cleveland (where Jacobs Field is a bit more forgiving to a pitcher who gives up the long ball than Coors Field), Elarton logged a 4.53 ERA in 21 starts, considered to be along the league average, and managed a 4.12 ERA after the All-Star Break.

Meche and Elarton make for good stories in 2005 - Meche having his labrum surgery in 2001, Elarton having his in 2002. While both make for good stories, I only care about Elarton - I mean, he's on my team. What did you expect?

Bonds v. McGwire

A recent article has pointed out that if a vote were to take place today among sportswriters, Barry Bonds would make the Hall of Fame, but Mark McGwire would not.

Now, I've been back and forth about McGwire in the past regarding the Hall of Fame, and I've got no issues with arguing his merit as a player, but the biggest argument against McGwire at this moment seems to be his use of "performance enhancers" during his playing career, namely during the latter part of his career.

Now, I'm not big on the whole steroid issue. I don't want to see records be broken by players using steroids. The issue though with McGwire is that he has not admitted (and there is no proof) that he used anything that was illegal, whether it be by Major League Baseball's rules or by state or federal law, during his playing career.

McGwire admitted to using Androstenedione during his career, which is now on the list of banned substances of Major League Baseball. At the time, andro wasn't illegal, so even if the product came up in McGwire's bloodstream, nothing could be said about it. McGwire retired after the 2001 season - andro wasn't banned until the 2004 season. If you're going to cast the finger of blame towards McGwire, you either have to determine that McGwire was using other suppliments during his playing days that were illegal. Whether or not McGwire would have continued using andro after it had been banned isn't the issue. You can't disqualify someone for doing something that wasn't illegal, just like you couldn't ticket a driver for going 60 MPH in a 45 MPH zone if the speed limit was 65 when he drove through it.

My bigger question is, after you throw out the steroid/andro question, does McGwire have the qualifications to be a Hall of Famer?

The problem facing Fred McGriff, Rafael Palmeiro, and later Jeff Bagwell, Frank Thomas, and possibly Jim Thome is that they were never the "best" player at their position - they were never standout players, like a Mantle or Mays were. How much of their success and statistical milestones can be attributed to longevity and the era that they played in instead of true "greatness"? McGwire doesn't have that problem - from 1995 to 2000, Mark McGwire was not only the best slugging first baseman in baseball, but quite possibly the most dangerous hitter in the game. Batting near .300, averaging over 50 home runs, and a slugging percentage of around .700, McGwire's numbers were several steps better than anyone else during that time.

The problem with that though is that we're talking six seasons - technically a little more than five, if you consider that McGwire only played in 104 games in '95 and 89 in 2000. When you look at the rest of his career, it looks something like this:

1986 (age 22) - cup of coffee (18 games total), 3 HR, .189/.259/.377
1987 (age 23) - Rookie of the year, 49 HR, .289/.370/.618
1988 (age 24) - sophomore slump, 32 HR, .260/.352/.478
1989 (age 25) - pitchers figure him out, 33 HR, .231/.339/.467
1990 (age 26) - a small step forward, 39 HR, .235/.370/.489
1991 (age 27) - the end of the line?, 22 HR, .201/.330/.383
1992 (age 28) - comeback season, 42 HR, .268/.385/.585
1993 (age 29) - lost to injury (27 games total), 9 HR, .333/.467/.726
1994 (age 30) - lost to injury again (47 games total), 9 HR, .252/.413/.474

Over the first nine years of McGwires career (technically six years if you don't count the '86, '93, and '94 seasons), McGwire was a .250/.362/.507 hitter, comparable to players like Cecil Fielder, Dave Kingman, and Norm Cash.

Of course, McGwire after that period was a different player - 345 HR, .278/.430/.683. So, does McGwire's five years of mind-boggling offensive numbers allow us to overlook six years of mediocrity?

It's possible, but there's something else that might stop Mark McGwire more than that.

Albert Belle.

While McGwire, doing the math, had 5 very good seasons and 6 mediocre seasons, Albert Belle had 10 seasons where he was at least among the better players in baseball. Belle's worst season (let's say 1992) saw him hit 34 HR, .260/.320/.477. In his ten full seasons in the majors, Belle never hit lower than that .260, never hit less than 23 home runs, never slugged lower than .474, and never drove in less than 95 runs. In fact, putting the two head to head, the two round out the 90's pretty even.

91: Belle
92: McGwire
93: Belle
94: Belle
95: Belle
96: McGwire
97: McGwire
98: McGwire
99: McGwire

But Belle doesn't have the questions surrounding him regarding suppliments, and the Hall of Fame has leaned towards consistent performance over a few good seasons. While I don't expect Belle to get into the Hall of Fame (he was never considered a popular player, especially towards the media), I think Belle has a stronger argument than McGwire, and if the two are put side-by-side, it may hurt McGwire's chances.

Erstad and the Angels

Many players in baseball have lived off of having a good glove. For certain positions on the field (shortstop, center field, catcher), teams are willing to look past offensive shortcomings. Darin Erstad could easily have a long career as that type of player.

The problem right now is that Erstad is being played much more than a "defensive specialist" would, and on top of that, is being played in his secondary position - a position where a "defensive specialist" isn't called for.

Erstad goes into 2005 as the Anaheim Angels' first baseman. Don't think that Erstad, a natural outfielder, is a bad first baseman. He won a Gold Glove at first last year. The question is what the Angels should do with Erstad, as they have to play him to justify the $16 million he is owed over the next two years. The Angels will be starting him at first base; his defensive abilities say that he should play in center field. Many Angel fans say he shouldn't be playing at all.

Well, let's look at the options:

Erstad at first - Erstad at first gives the Angels an outfield of Garrett Anderson in left, Steve Finley in center, and Vlad Guerrero in right. Jeff Davanon and Juan Rivera, the Angels fourth and fifth outfielders, sulk to the bench and fight over DH time, and uberprospect Casey Kotchman attempts to hit .400 in AAA. Now, Kotchman could make the major league roster, but the question is what hurts Kotchman more, letting him sit on the bench in the majors and playing every 5th day or so, or playing every day in AAA where he asks over and over again why he's there. Kotchman's the one with the most to lose here, as the Angels are putting their best bats in the outfield, and capable backups are getting the DH at-bats.

Erstad in center - Putting Erstad in center, his best position, means that either Anderson, Finley, or Guerrero go to the DH spot, Kotchman gets the opportunity to play first, and Davanon and Rivera struggle to see the playing field. While this doesn't seem like a feasable option now, it was possible several months ago, before the Angels signed the 40 year old Finley to a two year deal for $14 million. Finley, coming off one of his best seasons last year at the age of 39, seems like a lesser risk than many other 40 year olds, but with the $14 million to spend at one of two positions, one wonders how "necessary" it was for the Angels to put the resources in a center fielder when one was already on their roster.

Erstad on the bench - Understand that Erstad got the 4 year $32 million contract by doing more than flashing the glove. Erstad had a great year in 2000, batting .355 with 25 home runs and 28 stolen bases. As a 23 and 24 year old previous to that, Erstad posted an OPS over .800. Plus, Erstad was a hard-nosed player, a player who gave 100% on the field. While injuries (and perhaps other factors) have kept him from repeating those stats, he still had an OBP of around .350 last season, with success in 16 of his 17 stolen base attempts. While not necessarily a great player, he's not a horrible player. Putting him on the bench puts Kotchman into the spotlight, starting at first in Erstad's place.

So it all comes down to three players - Erstad, Kotchman, and Finley.

Kotchman had an opportunity to play last season, putting up .224/.289/.276 numbers in 38 games - not overly impressive. It's not really fair to judge Kotchman from those 38 games - he was 21 years old at the time, but that thought had to be sitting in the back of the minds of the Angels braintrust going into this offseason.

Sure, one could trade Erstad, but why? If Erstad gets traded, the Angels will likely pay most of his salary anyway, and have nothing to show for it except a mid-level prospect. While Erstad may not make the best starting player, he gives the Angels a flexabilty - even if the Angels decide to go with Kotchman, Erstad is there if Kotchman fails at the major league level again, and can play all three outfield positions, including center, a position currently manned by a 40 year old.

The Angels made a decision - they could have ignored Finley during free agency, put Kotchman at first and Erstad at center, but they felt that they had to add another bat during free agency, and instead of investing a lot of money in a Carlos Beltran in center (whom priced himself far out of what the Angels wanted to spend) or a Richie Sexson or Carlos Delgado at first (both of whom were also large financial investments that would have blocked Kotchman even more than Erstad), they went with a more "affordable" option with Finley, a good guy and a low risk option.

In a community where some pour seemingly endless money on a problem to cure it while others find it easier to complain about their lack of money, the Angels took the cards they were dealt and made the most of them.

Bonds suffers knee injury at hands of media

Ah, Barry Bonds. Just when I'm trying to finish up a rant about how the Devil Rays love to screw themselves over, you give me more things to write about. My ADD made it difficult to finish that article with this popping on the newswire.

Ok, now I'm focused.

Barry Bonds is upset. He says he could be out for half the season, or he could be out for the whole season. He could be out forever. He doesn't seem to care if he is or not. He's tired.

Tired tired tired.

And the thing is, there's a ton of people now who are screaming "I KNEW IT! STEROIDS! HE'S AFRAID!" And it's understandable. If Bonds were on steroids in the past and not on them now, he risks having a dramatic decline in his numbers and pretty much proving that his inflated numbers over the last few years were a result of BALCO, or stay on the steroids and end up getting caught. By claiming injury and sitting out half the season, or just not playing any more, we take away any evidence of the post-steroid policy Bonds to compare to the pre-steroid policy and Bonds numbers still hold up and it just becomes a source of argument without proof.

But look at it from Bonds perspective. He's 40 years old, not 34 like Jason Giambi. Very few baseball players play until they're 40, and no 40 year old player has played at the performance level that Bonds has. Assuming Bonds never took steroids, he comes into 2005 with a bad knee and a 40 year old body where he has to perform at the same level that he did the previous season, or else the finger gets pointed at steroids. He doesn't get a pass because he's old, unlike any other superstar who may have "hit the wall". Recently retired Roberto Alomar hit his wall at 34 - coming off possibly his greatest season in 2001, Alomar's average dropped 70 points, OBP 84 points, and slugging 165 points. No one says that Alomar was coming off "the juice" in 2002, they just attribute it to the downside of his career.

Bonds doesn't have this convienence. Add onto this a knee injury (that can surely affect performance) and there are many reasons for Bonds to have an "off" season in 2005, none of them steroid related. Of course, they could be steroid related, and the media and many fans would love to point the finger to that being the only reasoning behind it.

Bonds hasn't made himself a popular figure outside of the San Francisco Giants fanbase. He's not an overly friendly personality like Sammy Sosa (or at least like Sosa was) or an "aw shucks" type like Mark McGwire was when they were both going after Roger Maris's home run record in 1998. Bonds at times has come off smug and uncaring - whether justified in that image or not - and hasn't endeared himself to the media or the general fanbase. That's not Bonds' fault; he shouldn't have to smile and be happy-go-lucky if that's not his personality. However, in a baseball era where longstanding records held by baseball icons look to be broken, we want certain people to break them if they have to be broken. Bonds isn't one of those people.

It's unfortunate for Bonds because if he were "popular", the issue might not be as big as it is now. Mark McGwire showed all the signs of steroid use (he even admitted using a performance enhancing drug - Androstenedione - which wasn't technically "illegal" at the time), but people turned their heads and looked the other way because they liked McGwire, and wanted to see him as a record book guy. The majority doesn't want to see Bonds as a record book guy, regardless of what he does. Therefore, when we have an opportunity to prove why Bonds shouldn't be in the recordbooks, we'll jump all over it.

It's unfortunate and unfair, but at the same time, Bonds hasn't made himself a sympathetic figure. Seemingly blaming his injury on the media, Bonds made sure that it seemed that the reason he wouldn't be back was because of the media instead of his knee or any other reasoning. "You guys wanted to hurt me bad enough, you finally got me," Bonds said most recently, referring to the media. The fans and the media aren't directly related, and attempting to guilt the media into apologising and stating that you're not going to go back to playing because you're tired of the media bothering you isn't going to endear yourself to the fanbase you've been slowly alienating.

Sure enough, an ESPN.com poll asking what site visitors wanted to see Bonds do next saw "retire" leading the voting with almost 70% of the vote. Cal Ripken would never have run into a similar situation.

I feel bad for Bonds, but it's hard to feel sympathy for someone who seemingly asked for it this past announcement. Bonds says that he's tired of his kids crying because their dad keeps getting run down in the paper. If you know your father is clean and innocent, can't you take solice in knowing that the papers aren't telling the truth?

It's hard to find a "right" and "wrong" in this situation. There's a lot of gray.